Lralis) in order to save another (Optus) are illustrations of die failure of telecommu nications policy to produce economically rational outcomes.
The main deficiency in Australian telecommunications policy has been die fail ure to take adequate account of natural monopoly. Alternadve insdtudonal struc tures, designed to exploit economies of scale and scope, could have yielded both a more compeddve market structure and lower industry' costs.
Natural Monopoly and the Telecommunications Industry
The concept of natural monopoly is central to an understanding of tclecommunicadons policy. The concept was first given a dieoredcally sadsfactory definition, based on die idea of subadditivity, by Baumöl, Panzar and Willig (1982) . A cost function is subadditive when any given total output can be produced more cheaply by a sin gle firm dian by two or more separate firms. An industry in which die cost function is subadditive may dierefore be regarded as a natural monopoly Unregulated natural monopoly leads to inefficient duplication. Overinvestment on strategically important routes will be matched by underinvestment in areas where one of die firms has an effective monopoly. Eventually, however, one firm will eidier merge widi its competitors or drive diem out of business and the industry will become an actual as well as a natural monopoly. This process of strategic duplica tion and merger is now taking place in die Australian telecommunications indus tries, aldiough strategies arc complicated by die need to take account of die possible reactions of regulators.
Cost subadditivity in telecommunications. In die case of network goods such as telecommunications, a finer disaggregation of die possible sources of subadditivity is required. Consider a telecommunications enterprise offering local telephone serv ices in a number of districts, long-distance telephone services between diose districts and odicr services such as pay-TV and data communications. Several potential sources of cost subadditivity may be distinguished, including potential cost savings from:
(i) serv ing more customers in any one of die markets mentioned above;
(ii) serving multiple local markets; (iii) providing local and long-distance services joindy; and (iv) providing telephone, data and pay-TV services joindy.
Baumol ct al. distinguish between economics of scale (cost savings arising from producing larger volumes of a given bundle of goods and services) and economies of scope (cost savings arising from producing more dian one good or service in die same enterprise). In dieir framework, (i) represents economies of scale and (ii)-(iv) are different forms of economics of scope. However, in die analysis of network goods die term 'economies ol density' is often used to refer to (i), 'economics of scale' to refer to (ii) and 'economies of scope' to refer to (iii) and (iv).
In addition to these sources of cost savings, network economies arise with communications services because the service becomes more valuable to any given consumer as die number of odier consumers connected to die service increases. Network economies may be viewed as consumption externalides opposite in nature to congesdon externalides. They are associated widi natural monopoly, since die monopolist can internalise die externality.
Unfortunately, die empirical evidence on die extent and nature of economies of scale and scope in telecommunicadons is ambiguous. Shin and Ying (1992) and Spiller and Cardilli (1997) conclude diat telecommunicadons monopolies are 'un natural', but odiers, such as Roller (1990) and Gabel and Kennet (1991) , reach die opposite conclusion. Application of Sdgler's (1958) 'survivor' principle supports die latter view. Sdgler argues diat, in general, die survival of a monopoly enterprise faced widi actual or potential competition is evidence of scale economies. Despite deregulation in many countries widi different policy regimes, incumbent firms have remained dominant in most markets and nearly all local telephony markets (Harrison & Fisse, 1997) .
In diis article, it will be assumed diat economies of scale, diat is, economics ol type (i), apply to local services of all kinds, but not to long-distance services. No assumption will be made about die presence or absence of economies ol types (ii) to (iv). The problem for policy-makers is to design a framework which minimises restrictions on competition while ensuring dial economies of scale are captured and tliat any available economies of scope can be exploited.
Policy response to natural monopoly. Until recendy, die most common response to die problem of natural monopoly was public ownership of monopoly enterprises. Since die early 1980s, however, it has increasingly been assumed diat market disci pline is adequate even in situations of natural monopoly.
A dicorctical development supporting diis view was die idea of contestable mo nopoly, developed by Baumöl ct al. (1982) who stressed die importance of potential entry. Baumöl et al. supplemented die standard consideration of barriers to entry by consideration of barriers to exit, diat is, of sunk cosLs. They showed diat if diere were no barriers to entry or exit, die only sustainable set of prices lor a natural mo nopoly would be die Pareto-optimal set of Ramsey prices.
This dieorctical point was taken by many policymakers to be an all-purpose argument for laissez faire. As Baumöl and Willig (1986:10) state:
... bef ore anyone can legitimately use die analysis to infer that virtue reigns in some economic sector and diat interference is dierelore unwarranted, i
The set o f Ramsey prices (or, more precisely, markups over marginal cost) diat minimise welfare losses while covering average costs is analogous to die optimal set of commodity taxes required to raise a given revenue. The solution, derived by Ramsey (1927) , is to make die tax or markup for each good inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand.
that person must first provide evidence that die arena in question is, in fact, highly contestable.
Unfortunately, this requirement has been ignored by many participants in the Aus tralian policy debate. The term 'contestable' has been used loosely to refer to any market in which restrictions on entry have been relaxed or removed, without any attempt to examine die presence or absence of sunk costs, and hence die likelihood of an outcome free from monopoly pricing problems. The sloppy usage of terms like 'contestability' reflects a more general acceptance, on a basis of faidi rather dian economic analysis or empirical evidence, of a belief diat competition, or merely die direat of competidon, will always and everywhere generate socially opdmal out comes.
Sloppy use of contestability dieory has been supplemented by wishf ul thinking about technology, drawing on die claims of writers such as Tofller (1980) of a 'diird wave' of post-industrial society in which technology is inherendy biased towards small-scale production, and dierefore towards compedtivc outcomes. Oddly enough, die paradigm chosen by Toffler is die microcomputer industry, in which more dian 80 per cent of die market is controlled by a single operating system (Mi crosoft Windows) using central processing unit chips supplied by a single firm (In tel).
Disregarding die inconsistency of claiming diat a monopolistic industry will generate a competidvc f uture, advocates of die proposition diat technology has ren dered die concept of natural monopoly obsolete focus on evidence of convergence between die previously separate computer, television and telecommunicadons in dustries. Although most of diese industries have historically been eidier oligopolies or natural monopolies, it is asserted diat convergence between diem will result in a competitive free-for-all in which regulation will be unnecessary, or perhaps impossi ble.
Yet diere arc no grounds for supposing dial die concept of natural monopoly will be any less relevant in die future dian it has been in die past. Technological change may allow competition in previously monopolistic industries, but it may also generate new sources of natural monopoly.
The Process of Telecommunications Reform
As in most odicr OECD countries, Australian telecommunications services were provided, until die 1980s, by a government-owned monopoly. Significant reforms, directed towards strengdicning die government monopoly model, radier dian to wards market competition, had taken place during die 1970s. The main reform was die replacement of die f ormer Postmaster-General's Department, under which tele communications and postal services had been organised on public service lines, by two profit-making statutory corporations, Telecom and Australia Post. These re forms were highly successful in raising productivity and profitability (Industries As sistance Commission, 1989) aldiough cridcs argued diat, even alter diese gains, die enterprises were well below world best practice (Swan, 1990; Bureau of Industry Economics, 1992) .
The first move towards free-market reform came with the Davidson Report (Committee of Inquiry into Telecommunications Services in Australia, 1982) , which recommended that private networks be permitted to interconnect with the public network and resell excess capacity. Although the Report was initially re jected, its main recommendations were adopted in the statement issued in 1988 by Gareth Evans, then Minister for Communications, which expressed the govern ment's desire lor more extensive competition in the telecommunications sector and proposed corporatisation of public telecommunications enterprises. Under the Australian Telecommunications Corporation Act 1989, Telecom was required to follow 'clearly defined commercial principles and objectives'. In 1992, Telecom and OTC were merged to form the Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation, subsequently renamed Telstra, a corporation in which the government initially held all die shares.
A new regulatory framework for die telecommunications market was intro duced dirough the Telecommunications Act 1991. Under diis Act, a single com petitor for Telstra was admitted to die general telephony market. The successful tenderer was called Optus. As part of die entry conditions, Optus was required to purchase die Aussat satellite system, paying die government more dian its market value. The premium was, in effect, a licence fee (Maddock, 1992) . Optus was permitted to compete widi Telstra in all areas of telephone service. The duopoly regime was intended as an interim measure on die way to more open competition in 1997 (Brown, 1996) . The Australian Telecommunications Audiority (Austel, now die Australian Communications Audiority) was established to regulate prices and conditions of serv ice. Austel was also required to establish die access rules diat determined how much long-distance carriers would pay lor die access to Telstra's local network that was needed to complete calls.
It gradually became apparent dial the government had adopted a policy of net work duplication radier than hoping dial die mere direat of entry would force Tel stra to set prices for access to its network at a level consistent widi competitive out comes. The first clear indication of die government's intentions came widi die de cision to establish direc separate networks for digital mobile telephony. To induce Optus and Vodafone to establish digital networks, die government promised to phase out die existing analog network by 2000. The irony of promoting competi tion in one service by prohibiting die provision of anodier appears to have escaped diose responsible for diis decision.
The natural conclusion of reforms leading to a competitive telecommunications market would be die wididrawal of government from die telecommunications in dustry. In 1996, onc-diird of die public shareholding in Telstra was sold dirough a public float. legislation for die complete privatisation of Telstra was introduced in 1998, but was defeated in die Senate.
The Outcomes of Reform
Despite radical changes in telecommunications policy, changes in the telecommuni cations market, particularly lor services to residential users, have been modest. Moreover, the limited increase in competition that has occurred has been achieved at die cost of substantial dissipation of resources in strategic investments. Some of die more obviously unsatisfactory outcomes of reform are listed below.
• Telstra has remained officially dominant in all markets except diosc for mobile and international telephony, and its monopoly of local telephony has remained intact.
• Public control over Telstra's actions has been reduced dirough corporatisation and partial privatisation (see below).
• Telstra's quality of service has declined (Australian Communications Audiority, 1998) even tiiough technological improvements should have led to an increase in reliability.
• Price levels continue to be determined by regulation radier than competition. In most years, Telstra has reduced prices by exaedy die amount required to meet die price caps imposed under regulation (Austcl, various years; Albon, 1998).
• After racing to construct parallel hybrid-fibre cable networks for pay-TV services, Optus and Telstra halted dieir rollouts in 1997 leaving two incomplete, but largely overlapping, networks.
• Similar parallel networks for digital mobile telephony have failed to match die coverage of die existing analog mobile phone network.
• The analog mobile phone network is to be compulsorily shut down.
• To provide content for pay-TV networks, duplicate rugby league competitions were operated in 1997, providing entertainment services considerably less valu able dian that of a unified competition, but at much greater cost.
• Average prices have fallen, but only at die same rate as before reform took place.
Most of diese outcomes arc evident to any observer. But since it has often been claimed diat competition has resulted in lower prices, it may be wordi exam ining diis issue in more detail. The price cap imposed on Telstra for local and long-distance services required a 4.5 per cent annual reduction in real prices, very similar to die rate of reduction achieved over preceding decades (Arena et al., 1992) . As Austel (various years) and Spiller and Cardilli (1997) observe, Telstra met die price cap exaedy in most years. Albon (1998:323-4) concludes diat 'some productivity growth appears to have flowed dirough to excessively higher profits and maintenance of higher costs rather than price reductions'.
Some of die unsatisfactory outcomes of reform, such as the Super league fi asco and the failure of plagued Optus's attempts to enter the market for local te lephony, may be put down to bad luck or bad management. But all the policy fail ures listed result largely from a failure to take account of die importance of natural monopoly in telecommunications networks. Policy-makers who wanted to promote compedtion accepted diat technological developments had rendered die concept of natural monopoly obsolete, and assumed diat a competitive market could be legis lated into existence.
Moreover, die difficulties involved in managing die industry dirough regulation radier dian government ownership have been underesdmated. For example, com petition policy is designed to deal widi problems of monopoly power in a pardcular industry. The problems of defining die scope of an industry have been die subject of considerable study. But die study of muldmarket interactions, such as diose con sidered by Bulow et al. (1985) , is less well developed. The Super league and Aus tralis cases involved muldmarket interactions. In die case of Super Ixaguc, actions intended to enhance monopoly power in telecommunications and pay-TV markets were found to be justified because diey increased competition in die rugby league market. In the Australis case, die interests of die shareholders in die Australis pay-TV venture were sacrificed to promote die (arguably illusory) prospect of competi tion in local telephone markets. It is impossible to avoid decisions of diis kind in dealing widi multimarkct enterprises having natural monopoly characteristics, but regulators and courts are not well equipped to make such decisions.
Policy Alternatives
Policy choices in telecommunications, such as the extent to which dominant enter prises should be broken up, often involve trade-offs between competition and die exploitation of economies of scale and scope. In die current debate, competition is assumed to be highly desirable, but die grounds for diis assumption are not always clear. Two main arguments may be put forward in favour of competition.
First, under die standard assumptions, competitively determined prices are equal to marginal costs and are therefore consistent widi Parcto-optimality, while monopoly prices arc set above marginal costs and dicrefore generate deadweight losses. Where economies of scale and scope are present, diis simple analysis does not apply and it is necessary to consider two-part pricing schemes and Ramsey prices (Baumöl ct al., 1982) . In die absence of contestability, reductions in barriers to entry may reduce welfare.
In telecommunications, policies favouring increased competition and lower barriers to entry usually lead to 'rebalancing', diat is, a reduction in usage charges and an increase in access charges. Albon (1988 Albon ( , 1991 argues diat rebalancing, by bringing usage charges closer to marginal costs, will generate substantial welfare gains. However, Quiggin (1997a) observes dial access charges are similar in dieir effects to poll taxes, and generate similar adverse equity effects. The welfare costs of tax and welfare measures sufficient to offset these equity effects may exceed the welfare gains f rom rebalancing.
Second, it is often claimed that competition will yield 'dynamic' improvements in technical efficiency. This claim has little basis in economic theory and little em pirical support. Arguments that monopolies are subject to X-inefficicncy (Ixibenstein, 1966 ) and rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974) have been supported by little more than anecdotal evidence. This issue is discussed further in Quiggin (1998) .
The absence of a clear rationale for competition leads to confusion in policy design, since policies that maximise opportunities for entry will not, in general, be the same as policies that encourage price competition. Policy-makers in Australia appear to have been most concerned about opportunities for entry. T he next sec tion of this paper will, therefore, be concerned with ways in which die objective of increasing opportunities for entry could have been achieved at a lower cost in terms of reduced technical efficiency dian under die policy of network duplication.
The crucial requirement in achieving technical efficiency is diat die gains from natural monopoly should be exploited, radier dian dissipated dirough unnecessary duplication of facilities. I will assume diat duplication should be encouraged in die provision of long-distance telephone services and avoided in die physical provision of digital and analog mobile telephone networks, local copper-wire telephone net works and local optical-fibre or hybrid fibre-cable networks lor telephony and pay-TV. This specification of objectives leaves open die boundaries of die natural m o nopoly sector, but is sufficient to suggest alternatives to die policy of network dupli cation.
A better duopoly. T he effect of network duplication has been to maintain Telstra's monopoly of local telephony, while setting up an effective duopoly in most odier segments of die market. I begin by specifying a policy framework that would have yielded greater technical efficiency dian, and at least as much competition in all segments of die market as, die policy of network duplication.
The first step, as widi die policy of network duplication, would have been die admission of a second long-distance carrier. The second step would have been the replication, for digital mobile telephony and pay-TV, of die common carrier ar rangement already in place for analog. That is, a single physical network would be constructed, widi bodi long-distance carriers having access on equal terms. Telstra would be excluded from die provision of pay-TV or other content, and die network would be a common carrier for content providers. Finally, die restrictions on entry by value-added resellers would have been removed immediately, rather dian in June 1997. W idi die removal of die need to provide 'infant industry' protection to O p tus in die forlorn hope of building up a full-scale competitor for Telstra, competi tion from value-added resellers could have been allowed live years earlier.
This framework would have yielded significant efficiency gains by avoiding wasteful duplication in die provision of physical networks, and minimising die dissi pation of resources in attempts to secure monopoly control of pay-rl"V content. It would also have provided more competition dian die policy of network duplication.
Consumers would have had a continuing choice between analog and digital mobile telephone networks, at least until the digital network was clearly superior in cover age and service. By paying for a single connection to the cable network, consumers would have had a wide choice of content providers.
Competition between technologies.
Existing policy has focused on promoting competition between enterprises, at tire cost of making highly prescriptive decisions about technology, such as die compulsory phaseout of analog mobiles. An alterna tive would have been to encourage competition between technologies. Analog and digital mobile services are close substitutes and arc also a substitute lor wires-based local and long-distance services. Competition could have been enhanced, relative to die 'better duopoly' model, by selling the analog network and die right to develop a digital network to separate firms.
Because of die trade-oil between compcddon and economies ol scope, it is dif ficult to say whcdier die 'compcddon between technologies' model would have been superior to die 'better duopoly' model. Once again, however, bodi competidon and technical efficiency would be greater than under die policy of network duplicadon.
A more radical extension of die 'compcddon between technologies' model would have involved die creadon of a new public or private enterprise to provide cable telephone and pay-TV services in compcddon widi Telstra's copper wire net work. Such a policy would have involved some difficuldes. Telstra would have had an incentive to forestall entry by strategic investment in technologies such as asym metric digital subscriber lines in areas where cable rollout was likely to take place early. This is die opposite pattern to dial required for a cost-minimising solution, which would involve upgrading die existing copper wire network precisely in diose places where a cable rollout was uneconomical. However, the waste involved in strategic investments of this kind would be less dian dial observed under die policy of network duplication.
A breakup o f Telstra.
A diird possibility would be a breakup of Telstra into a set of local monopolies and a long-distance enterprise competing widi new entrants, simi lar to die breakup of die Bell monopoly in die United States in 1976. Within any given market, die effect would be similar to that of die improved duopoly model, except dial it would no longer be possible to choose an integrated local and long distance carrier. Some economies of scope would be sacrificed to achieve more even competition between long-distance carriers.
The idea diat natural monopolies should, where possible, be disaggregated into regional components has been popular since die Bell breakup, diough die under lying reasoning is not clear. The possibility of 'benchmark competition' has been mentioned but die difficulties in defining comparable benchmarks are formidable (Quiggin, 1997b) . The fact diat horizontal reintegration (dirough mergers) of US local telephone services commenced as soon as regulatory barriers to merger were relaxed suggests diat breakups involve a loss of economies of scale and scope.
A n assessment. All the options considered above are superior to the policy of net work duplication on the criteria of competition and technical efficiency. The policy of network duplication has yielded a modest increase in competition at a high cost in terms of technical inefficiency. Maintenance of die public monopoly would have yielded an outcome superior to diat actually achieved. Comparisons among die diree are less clear-cut. My tentadve judgment is diat die improved duopoly model would have yielded significandy increased compeddon at only a modest cost in terms of technical efficiency and would probably have been die opdmal choice.
Corporatisation, Privatisation and Regulation of Telstra
In all die alternadves considered above, Telstra would remain die dominant sup plier of local telephone services, just as it is under the policy of network duplication. Hence, regulation of access prices and final consumer prices would be necessary. Hie policy issues arising from die need for continued control of die local telephone monopoly are largely independent of die framework adopted for die remainder of die telecommunications system.
The central policy issue is the appropriate organisational form for die local monopoly. For each possible organisational structure, it is necessary to consider an appropriate regulatory framework. In general, control through public ownership is a substitute for regulation, so diat die closer die ownership structure is to full priva tisation, die more elaborate die system of regulation required to achieve any given divergence from die unregulated monopoly outcome. Thus, die choices of organ isational form and of regulatory framework must be made joindy.
The central issue in regulation of monopolies is diat of setting maximum prices. For short periods, systems based on a historical starting point, such as CPI minus X regulation, may be adequate. However, in die long term, such regulatory systems inevitably reduce to rate-of-return regulation. The result will be a repeated game between die monopoly and die regulator (acting as an agent for consumers), in which bodi sides face substantial risk. Welfare losses arc associated with diis risk and widi rent-seeking attempts to influence regulatory outcomes.
Much of die risk associated with the regulation game is internalised if die mo nopoly is publicly owned, since die government acts as die representative of bodi consumers and taxpayers, die owners of die enterprise. A gain to consumers from low prices is balanced by a corresponding loss to taxpayers.
In considering die desirability or odierwise of privatisation, it is necessary to balance efficiency gains from privatisation against die cost of regulatory risk. The critical question is whedier privatisation passes die present value test, diat is, whedier, widi an appropriate choice of discount rate, die present value of future income under public ownership exceeds die price diat private buyers are willing to pay.
The issue is complicated by die unresolved debate over die relative capacity of governments and private capital markets to bear die risk associated widi systematic fluctuations in aggregate output (Hadiaway, 1997; Quiggin, 1997c; Grant & Quiggin, 1998) , and hence whedier die discount rate should include a large 'equity premium' (Mehra & Prescott, 1985) . However, rate-of-return regulation effectively insulates monopolies from systematic risk, so that no risk premium is required. Hence, the appropriate discount rate is the rate of interest on government bonds.
The partial privatisation of Telstra fails die present value test. Following the passage of die Telstra (Dilution of Public Ownership) Act 1996, one-third of die public shareholding in Telstra, consisting of approximately 4.3m shares, was sold at an average price of $3.40, yielding sale proceeds of $14 billion. At a nominal inter est rate of 6 per cent, die interest saving from repayment of public debt is $840m a year.
Income forgone dirough privatisadon comprises dividends, retained earnings and imputation credits unclaimed by die government. For 1997-98, die first year alter pardal privadsadon, Telstra's total profits were $3.0 billion of which $1.8 bil lion were paid as fully franked dividends and die remaining $1.2 billion retained (Telstra, 1998) . The value accruing to die private shareholders, and forgone by tax payers, consisted of $600m in dividends, approximately $240m in franking credits, and $400m in retained earnings, for a total of $ 1,240m. Comparison of diis oppor tunity cost widi die interest savings from privadsadon shows dial diere was a net loss to taxpayers of $400m. Unless Telstra's earnings fail to grow in nominal terms, die loss to die public will rise over dine.
The abandonment of proposals for full privadsadon raises new difficulties. A partially private, partially public enterprise is an unsatisfactory hybrid. Its managers are subject simultaneously to political accountability, for example dirough freedom of information legislation, and to die fiduciary obligation to put die interests of shareholders ahead of all odicr concerns (Quiggin, 1996) . Each system of account ability is compromised by die presence of die odier. For example, claims of com mercial confidentiality have been used to override die principle of freedom of in formation. The present mixed status of Telstra is unsatisfactory. If lull privatisation is not to take place in die near future, full government ownership should be re stored.
Unscrambling the Egg
Given die mistakes that have already been made, where do we go from here? There may still be an opportunity to reorganise die Australian telecommunications industry to take account of the implications of its natural monopoly characteristics. The central element of any such reorganisation would be the restoration of full gov ernment ownership of Telstra, which would act as a common carrier system for cable TV and local telephony allowing consumers access to all content providers regardless of die carrier supplying dieir access to die cable network. This would permit die divestiture of Telstra's interest in die content provider Foxtel. Telstra could also be required to divest its digital mobile telephony business, while being allowed to continue offering analog services beyond 2000.
The feasibility of such a reorganisation is constrained by existence of contrac tual guarantees diat policy will not be changed. Most notably, aldiough it is gener ally recognised diat die decision to close down die analog mobile network was a mistake, the I,abor government set this mistake in concrete through its contracts with the digital carriers, Optus and Vodafone.
The difficulty of fixing past mistakes in telecommunications policy is an exam ple of a more general problem. In many cases where the provision of public serv ices is handed over to the private sector, the profitability of the private provider de pends primarily on political decisions. Hence, die private provider must demand either a risk premium or a guarantee against future adverse political decisions.
In most cases, politicians eager to secure a politically attractive deal have found it easier to provide the guarantees and leave their successors to deal with die conse quences. Binding die hands of future governments in diis way is undemocradc and bad policy. If such guarantees are required to attract private providers of services, it is best to keep diose services in die public sector.
Concluding Comments
Australia, like New Zealand and die United Kingdom, has undergone radical mi croeconomic reform over die past 20 years. Yet dicre is no clear evidence diat diis reform has resulted in an increase in die sustainable rate of economic growdi. An analysis of Australian telecommunications policy suggests a pardal explanation for diis unsadsfactory outcome. Much of die potential benefit to be derived from re form of die telecommunications industry has been dissipated in wasteful and tech nically unnecessary investment in duplicate networks. This is die natural result of policies based on a naive cndiusiasm for competition and wishful diinking about die deadi of natural monopoly.
